Bush/Kerry: The Security Debate
Immediately after the attacks on New York and Washington Osama Bin Laden was the top priority not merely because he was behind the events of that day, and not merely because he represented the head of the serpent, but because he had many of the essential attributes of a commander-in-chief: a significant fighting force under his command, secure bases from which to operate, a well-defined command and control structure, large-scale financial and material resources, and an international infrastructure for force-projection. And Afghanistan was the top priority not because the odious Taliban regime itself represented any serious threat but because of its use of Afghani sovereignty to shield Bin Laden: we had to go through the Taliban to get to Al Quaeda.
But once the Taliban was demolished, once the Al Quaeda safe havens were eliminated and its financial and material infrastructure fragmented, once the Al Quaeda command and control structure was disrupted and its leadership forced underground, Afghanistan largely lost its strategic significance. Al Quaeda and its cousins persist but as a dispersed network to which Afghanistan is of only minor significance; the capture of Bin Laden now, while a boost for morale in America, will no longer significantly affect the Islamic movement he champions or the terrorist network he spawned. And although support for an Afghani democracy is both desirable and a moral obligation after our invasion, Afghanistan is too remote and too poor to serve as a model for greater political possibilities or as a voice for moderation in either the Islamic or the Arab worlds. Senator Kerry’s fixation on Bin Laden and Afghanistan illustrates a continuation of the mindset of the 1990s: that the war on terror is more a matter of law-enforcement and homeland security than a matter of military and cultural strategic significance.
As for Iraq, although President Bush embarrassed himself with his endless repetition of the mantra about sending mixed messages, Senator Kerry’s continued contention that Iraq is a distraction from the “real” war on terror almost guarantees that President Kerry will turn it into one. His position, reaffirmed in the debate, seems to be more that we must fix Iraq because we broke it than that we must fix Iraq for any strategic purpose. If that is his limited goal – to fix what we broke and get the hell out – then he is likely to settle for the first political solution that seems moderately stable rather than putting in the greater effort required to achieve viable democratic institutions. But if Iraq emerges merely as yet another Arab tyranny, or worse as yet another Islamic theocracy, we will have gained almost nothing for our risk, treasure, blood, and frayed alliances. The primary strategic justification for invading Iraq – notwithstanding the real yet remote threat of Iraqi WMD or the accusations from the left of some more nefarious agenda – was to establish a beachhead for democracy and prosperity within the middle-east from which moderate Muslims could strive against the tide of Islamic fundamentalism. If we give up on that then it truly will have been a colossal waste.
© Copyright 2004, 2005, Augustus P. Lowell